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THE HUDOOD LAWS OF PAKISTAN: 
A SOCIAL AND LEGAL MISFIT IN TODA Y'S SOCIETY 
AARIJ S. WAST(f 
ABSTRACT 
This article questions the application of religion in Pakistan, specifi-
cally in the legal context. For over two decades now, Pakistan has had 
on the books a number of statutory laws, which are collectively known 
as the Hudood Laws. These laws are purported to inject Qu 'ranic 
doctrine into Pakistan's criminal legal structure. Un.fortunately, a num-
ber of shortcomings have been identified with the change since its 
beginnings. Among these faults are a lack of religious knowledge and 
understanding by the judiciary, police force, and population; misuse 
and abuse of the laws by the nation's ruling elite, men, and the police; 
lacking legal and social infrastructure in support of the laws; and most 
devastatingly, imprecise and many times incorrect interpretation of 
Islam and its legal teachings. Out of respect for the divine law, an 
appeal is made .first to suspend the Hudood laws, if not to cease their 
resulting injustices. It is subsequently recommended that a committee of 
legally and theologically trained experts be formed, that they re-exam-
ine Islam's legal teachings, and finally that they explore a just and 
appropriate manner in which to introduce correct principles to current 
Pakistani society and its primarily common law system. 
t Originally from Calgary, Alberta, Aarij S. Wasti completed junior and high school at the 
Lahore American School in Pakistan. He later attained a B.Com at McGill University before 
receiving his LL.B from Dalhousie Law School. Aarij spent a number of summers in 
Islamabad, Pakistan working at banking and legal firms, and he has travelled extensively 
throughout five continents. Aarij speaks both English and Urdu, has a basic understanding of 
French, and can read Arabic. 
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Author's Note: 
It is important for the reader to understand the perspective from which 
the following paper is written. I believe that the Qur 'an is a divine book, 
one which I see as the guidebook to living life. Law, in both practice and 
theory, is a large part oflife. Shari 'ah translates as "the path to follow; a 
name given to the sacred law of Islam that governs all aspects of a 
Muslim's life."1 One of the fundamental principles of Islam and of its 
Shari 'ah is the seeking of truth. This paper is not an attempt at bringing 
into question Islam or Shari' ah or any of its teachings, including the 
principles of Hadd as laid out in the Qur 'an itself; for that would be 
bringing in to doubt the very faith I hold so dear. What this work is, 
however, is a study and critical analysis of the application oflslamic law 
in Pakistan. It is an unfortunate reality that even such pursuit of knowl-
edge and the truth is perceived by many as apostasy, due to the preva-
lence of what I term as an 'illiterate culture' - nevertheless, the reality is 
that such analysis and critique is desperately necessary. Justice, the 
process of development, and a hope for a better tomorrow demand it. 
Indeed, it is precisely this lack of commentary and academic debate 
about such topics which has kept the entire Muslim world's identity 
crisis aflame, and left its people deprived of their dreams and true 
potential. 
In the name of God (Allah): The most gracious, the most merciful. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, entering into the second year of their most recent of (Pakistan's 
frequent) periods of martial law, the people of that nation had largely 
adapted to the changes brought about by the displacement of democ-
racy. For the majority of the population, these changes were, in practice, 
minimal; as inhabitants of a still-developing country, the focus of the 
people had remained on daily sustenance and the fulfilling of their other 
1 M. Lippman, S. McConville & M. Yerushalmi, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure: An 
Introduction (New York: Pruger, 1988) at 25 [Lippman, McConville & Yerushalmi]. 
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basic needs. This changed the following year, however, as Pakistan's 
military dictator, President General Zia-ul-Haq, introduced the Hudood 
Ordinances and Rules to Pakistan's criminal branch of its legal system. 
These were the first set of 'Islamic' statutes to be incorporated into a 
previously mixed legal system of British common law and Muslim 
personal law. An already adulterated legal system had become ever 
more mixed, and because of inherent weaknesses within that system, the 
people of Pakistan would now be judged ever more harshly, unfairly, 
and incorrectly. 
The following is a basic survey of the nature and effects of the 
Hudood Ordinances of Pakistan. It aims to examine the scope of the 
laws, their legitimacy, and finally examples of their application. It will 
be argued that Islamic law, while valid in its own right and on its own 
merit, was not suited for introduction to Pakistan, given the socio-
economic conditions of the time. The following sets out to show that an 
in-depth knowledge of Islam, with an emphasis on its legal aspects, is 
both indispensable and decisively lacking in the Pakistani legal system, 
from its police officers to its lawyers to the justices of its courts. This 
fact, in tandem with the social realities of Pakistan, makes the just 
interpretation of any law not merely improbable; as will be shown, it 
makes the just interpretation of Islamic law impossible. 
This paper begins by laying out the historical background to the 
legal events that took place in 1979 and afterwards, and the impact that 
they have had on Pakistan since. This is followed by a short introduction 
to Islamic law, including its definition, sources, and a brief overview of 
its historical evolution. The most relevant concepts of Islamic law to the 
Hudood Ordinances are then discussed, including Hadd and Ta 'azir. 
These tenns are defined and the entailing offences, punishments, pur-
poses, evidentiary requirements, and underlying values are examined. A 
brief examination of the specific Pakistani context is followed by an in-
depth analysis of Pakistan's Hudood laws, which begins with a brief 
look at Pakistan's legal history and ends with a critique of the laws' 
application and legitimacy. This analysis includes an examination of the 
statutes themselves, procedural aspects of implementation, and the Is-
lamic laws' evolutionary effect on Pakistan's legal system. In turn, each 
of the ordinances is examined separately. Attention is given to the rules 
as legislated, their exceptions, limitations or pre-conditions, if any, and 
criticisms against their legitimacy. Finally, this analysis will expand on 
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the conclusion that Pakistan's Hudood laws be suspended immediately 
and indefinitely, until such time that Pakistan is deemed socioeconomi-
cally, culturally, and religiously ready to properly implement divine 
law. 
1. History & Background 
At midnight on August 14, 194 7, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was 
carved out of British India, the product of decades of both political and 
legislative wrangling from London to Bombay.2 The five provinces to 
comprise the new nation were inhabited by vastly different peoples with 
a divergent assortment of languages and cultures. Arguably the only 
thread linking these various groups was their common religion, namely 
that oflslam.3 Today, somewhat reduced in size by the loss in 1971 of 
the province of East Pakistan (now the independent nation of 
Bangladesh), Pakistan's population of nearly 150 million is approxi-
mately ninety seven percent Muslim.4 
For a variety of socio-economic reasons, Pakistan since the late 
1970s has been struggling through a period of Islamization.5 This has 
meant, inter alia, greater awareness of Islam and its applicability to 
daily life among Pakistan's populace.6 It has also meant the emergence 
ofreligious extremism and increased use ofreligion as a political tool. It 
was the combination of these two factors that lead to the proclamation 
on February 10, 1979, of the Hudood Ordinances by the then military 
dictator of Pakistan, President General Zia-ul-Haq.7 
The Islamization of Pakistan had already begun earlier that year, 
however, with the introduction of the Shari 'ah, or Islamic, Courts.8 
2 S. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 340. 
3 L. Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Kent: Dawson Westview, l 980) 
at 26. 
4 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact book ( 1999), online: Central 
Intel I igence Agency <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publ ications/factbook/geos/pk.html#People>. 
5 L. Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Cemw:v: A Political HistOIJ' (Karachi: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999) at 462 [Ziring]. 
6 Pakistan, introduction ofHudood lall's in Pakistan (Islamabad: Pakistan Publications, 1985) 
at 4 [Pakistan]. 
7 Ibid. at 11. 
8 Ziring, supra note 5 at 465. 
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While it was argued at the time that the religious courts were meant tc 
supplement the existing conventional court structure rather than replace 
it, great controversy was nonetheless aroused by its inception. Such was 
the case with many of Zia's "high priority" refonn agenda items.9 His 
justification was simply that the establishment of such courts would 
enable the proper implementation of' Islamic justice,' the very thing, he 
argued, that Pakistan had been created for in the first place. The function 
of the new court, located in the capital city of Islamabad, would be to 
determine whether existing laws were in violation of Islamic principles 
and injunctions. 10 
With both the Federal Shar'iah Court and the Hudood Ordinances in 
place, a vigorous new campaign from the government called for mass 
conformity to "Islamic codes of behaviour." From that point forward, 
drinking alcohol, attending bawdy houses, and gambling (among other 
offences) were all deemed to be crimes against Islam the first such 
crimes in Pakistan's legal history. Zia called on the nation to fulfill their 
recreational needs through prayer, family activity, and constructive 
social acts, and threatened that the new laws would deal harshly with 
any violation of the new code. From the beginning, this threat was 
carried out with vigour. Public lashings, for example, took place on 
numerous occasions immediately following the enactment of the new 
laws. However, more brutal punishments common to other countries 
practicing Shar'iah, including the removal of limbs, were initially dis-
couraged. 11 
It is important to note that since Pakistan's inception, its legal 
system had been a ramshackle and clumsy machine. Prior to the intro-
duction of the Hudood Ordinances, Pakistan's legal system had been 
composed of an uneasy mix of colonial legislation, Koran-derived laws 
of inheritance, and Muslim personal laws, the latter dealing mostly with 
family matters. 12 Islamic "public" law was the most recent addition to an 
already complicated and unwieldy system. It was argued at the time that 
the Islamization of Pakistan's law was imperative, because Islamic law 
was perceived as the sum and substance of Islam itself. The purpose of 
" Ziring, supra note 5 at 466. 
10 Ziring, supra note Sat 465. 
11 Ziring, supra note 5 at 466. 
12 A. Jahangir & H. Jilani, A Divine The Hudood Ordinances (Lahore: Rhotas 
Books, l 990) at 17 [Jahangir & Jilani]. 
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law, it was stated, is to "bend earthly life to the purposes of God." 13 To 
do so would signify Pakistan's allegiance to the Qur'an, both in abstract 
and as a concrete legal code - necessary, it was argued, since in Islam 
the state is conceived of as a moral institution charged with enforcing 
stipulations as set forth in the Shar 'iah, including the Sunnah, or teach-
ings and traditions of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him). It 
can neither add, alter, nor abrogate it. 14 Islamic law is nothing but 
Allah's message of what a man must do and what a man must avoid 
doing. Specifically, the 'resurgence' of Islam in Pakistan was seen 
widely as the responsibility of the Muslims themselves, without further 
divine guidance. 15 A step towards Islamization was urged to be seen as a 
"transition from indifference to self-directing determination," part of 
which would lead to, it was hoped, the foundation of a new phase of 
legal dynamism in the nation. 16 It was argued from the outset that 
"Islamisation of laws and jurisprudence in Pakistan is an effort to bring 
all temporal laws in conformity with the will of the divine enshrined in 
the Shari 'ah." 17 
Zia's Islamization of Pakistan included numerous other acts of 
reform, all limited in success, the totality of which eventually led to his 
government's admission of its inability to "counter the demagogic 
manipulation of controversial issues." 18 In fact, time and again, the 
fallout from the program would prove to be an embarrassment to his 
government, both through the identification of flaws and the realization 
of the basic inapplicability of such reform to Pakistan's already volatile 
society. While Islamization was seen to be prima facie a desirable 
objective of a nation that was at the time ninety five percent Muslim, it 
had proven from the beginning to be a dangerous and precarious job. 19 
This was due to the increasing volatility in the social fabric as a result of 
the changes, the heightened questioning of not only Zia's reforms, but 
his leadership itself, and the confusion being caused by a sudden and 
rapid development in an otherwise stable, albeit ineffective, legal sys-
13 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 3. 
14 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 5. 
15 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 5. 
16 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 4. 
17 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 6. 
18 Ziring, supra note 5 at 467. 
19 Ziring, supra note 5 at 467. 
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tern. Plagued by a continuing lack of success, and under political pres-
sure both at home and abroad, Zia finally slowed the process, though the 
overall campaign continued. Unfortunately, this change of pace, 
coupled with Zia's mounting frustration, transformed the process from a 
morally idealistic initiative to little more than a political tool. The 
government began removing allegedly "anti-Islamic" reading materials 
from schools and libraries and banning films and books it judged to be 
hedonistic, immoral, or contrary to Islamic principles. Provincial gov-
ernments were given the authority to police sermons during Friday 
prayers. The government even issued an ordinance making it a violation 
of the law to preach hatred against other beliefs, or against the ruling 
government. It appeared that Zia's government had claimed spiritual 
legitimacy for all its actions. Nonetheless, by and large, the program of 
Islamization existed more in theory than in practice.20 
There were also personnel problems with Zia's political movement. 
Expansion of the Shari' ah Courts required far more scholars of the 
Shari 'ah itself and fiqah law, or legal theology, than were readily 
available. Zia had predicted that this void would be filled from within 
the madrasahs, or religious welfare schools. However, reality dictated 
that the courts would still be shorthanded.21 The staff available to the 
Shari 'ah Courts was inadequate in both their numbers and their qualifi-
cations, despite the intentions of Zia's Constitutional arnendrnents.22 
This problem was particularly acute at the district level. While it was 
planned to include at least two learned scholars of Islamic jurisprudence 
in each jurisdiction, filling the gap with truly competent Pakistanis 
proved to be impossible. The importation of judges from other Muslim 
nations was tabled as a possible solution, but was not implemented due 
to yet another fundamental dilemma; namely, that the foreign justices 
would not have possessed the required understanding of Pakistan's 
society to justly apply the law - theoretically, the purpose of the reform 
in the first place. Towards the end of Zia's rule, it had become painfully 
clear that the ambitions of the Islarnization program had far exceeded 
Pakistan's limited available human resources. 23 This was yet another 
20 Ziring, supra note 5 at 467. 
21 Ziring, supra note 5 at 469. 
22 M.A. Khan, ed., The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Karachi: 
Pakistan Law House, 1996.) 
23 Ziring, supra note 5 at 469. 
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factor that contributed to the slowing of the reforms. It had, moreover, 
become clear that the Islamic state which Zia's regime was t1ying to 
create was being impeded by chronic and widespread underdevelop-
ment. The problem lay not in the idea, but in its time and place of 
application. Pakistan, it seemed, was attempting too much, too soon. 
Over and above this, it appeared that the proponents of a more religious 
order in Pakistan themselves disagreed on too many of the required 
fundamentals of an Islamic state, the establishment of which being a 
necessary prerequisite to the just application of Islamic law.24 
In the end, to salvage at least a partial success, Zia sought grassroots 
support by portraying the Islamization campaign as an attempt to im-
prove the lives of Pakistan's impoverished masses, especially in the 
villages with their limited access to conventional legal remedies. This 
was not mere propaganda; he was apparently sincere in his belief that 
religious courts were the best (perhaps the only) method of bringing 
justice to the peasant populace of Pakistan.25 
Professor Lawrence Ziring comments on Zia in his book "Pakistan 
in the Twentieth Century: A Political History": 
The common folk, he would opine, could not be expected to bring 
their everyday grievances to courts dispensing Anglo-Saxon justice. 
The rural people, though ignorant of their rights in the Common Law, 
nevertheless had legitimate grievances that could only be addressed 
within the cultural context of their religious lives. 26 
While critics of the time conceded that justice for all of the country's 
citizens would involve different approaches, the point nonetheless re-
mained that Zia's initiative - the introduction of an Islamic legal system 
to a predominantly secular one - was a decidedly inadequate solution. 
While proponents of a purely Islamic legal system today still sup-
port an active and organized lobby in Pakistan, they lack large-scale 
popular support.27 This is evidenced by the traditionally poor perfor-
mance of the religious political parties in Pakistani elections,28 though 
this may, judging by the results of Pakistan's October 2002 general 
24 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 17. 
25 Ziring, supra note 5 at 469. 
26 Ziring, supra note 5 at 469. 
27 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 17. 
28 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 17. 
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elections, be changing. While this traditional lack of support does not 
mean that the masses' legal needs could not be better served by Islamic 
law, it may very well indicate a lack of understanding of that law, or 
worse, an indication of the inherent flaws in the post-reforn1 justice 
system as a whole. The problem may lie deeper than the specific legal 
system that the courts adjudicate under. Nonetheless, the religious ele-
ments in Pakistani society do maintain substantial political clout, and 
have repeatedly hijacked reforms seen as inconsistent with their view of 
Islam and Islamization. Indeed, even Benazir Bhutto's left-of-centre 
government did not revoke, suspend, or amend the Hudood laws, de-
spite her two terms in office. It appears that the laws were kept intact in 
an effort to hold together often precarious coalition governments, in 
which the religious parties were a critical pillar. This hijacking of 
reform is normally carried out in the name of religion, a potent tool with 
the power to inflame the masses, incite civil unrest, and even destabilize 
the government itself. This consequently can sabotage the basic inten-
tions of the reformists, thus bringing the process full circle. It is possible 
that Bhutto's government was threatened with such action if any attempt 
to 'de-reform' the legal system was made. In this dynamic, the mass 
ignorance of the masses towards their own religion cannot be overstated 
in its significance; indeed, the same can be said of the majority of the 
current proponents of continued Islamization. In both these cases, igno-
rance truly is bliss, and is used to its full political advantage. 
2. Islamic Law 
Islamic law, commonly referred to as the Shari 'ah, stems from four 
sources:29 these include the Qur'an; the Sunnah as defined above; rea-
soning through analogy; and consensus among Ulema, Muslim scholars 
and the guardians of Islamic legal and religious traditions.30 While this 
might suggest very little codification or rigidity within the legal struc-
ture, by the early tenth century the opposite had become the case. The 
scholarly consensus at the time asserted that the door of ijtihad, or the 
use of individual judgement to interpret existing law and establish legal 
29 N.J. Coulson, A Histmy of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. Press, 1978) [Coulson]. 
30 Lippman, McConville & Yerushalmi, supra note I. 
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decisions, was closed. 31 The consensus for this decision, or the ijma, set 
the final seal upon the gradually increasing rigidity of Islamic law.32 In 
essence, Islamic jurisprudence had resigned itself to nothing more than 
self-imposed terms of reference.33 Regardless of whether this should 
ever have occurred, a limited number of laws were to remain codified 
and unchangeable. These are the laws of Hadd (pl. Hudood), or the only 
offences proscribed by God Himself and punishable by the penalties set 
forth in the Qur'an.34 Accompanying these specific provisos are strict 
evidentiary or proof requirements, the failure of which allow secondary 
or discretionary punishment of the offending behaviour, otherwise 
known as Ta 'azir punishments.35 Additionally, there are Ta 'azir of-
fences, independent in their own right from offences of Hadd. Both 
categories of offence are discussed below. 
3. Hadd 
Hadd, when translated, reads: "measure, limit or obstruction."36 The 
Qur'an and the Sunnah explicitly set out all the Hadd offences and their 
corresponding punishments, which can thus neither be altered nor modi-
fied. 37 The explicit mention of a small number of heinous offences aims 
to expunge them from Islamic society, ensuring the preservation of 
Islamic values of the dignity of human society and the purification of the 
human soul.38 It is important to note that in all Hadd crimes, punishment 
is to be directly proportionate to the magnitude of the crime committed. 
These punishments are intended to deter people from causing harm and 
mischief,39 to humiliate the offender,40 and to educate the public.41 In 
31 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 28. 
32 Coulson, supra note 29. 
33 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 28. 
34 Coulson, supra note 29. 
35 Coulson, supra note 29. 
36 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 7. 
37 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 7. 
38 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 6. 
39 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 7. 
40 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 8. 
41 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 9. 
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addition, one or more of the Haddpenal laws may have reformation and 
prevention as additional goals.42 
Crimes falling under the category of Hadd include: Zina (adultery or 
fornication); the use of intoxicants (including alcohol and drugs); theft 
of property; robbery of travellers; Qazf (false accusations of adultery); 
and apostasy. These offences can be established either by a voluntary 
confession made before the court, or by the testimony of a specific 
number of eyewitnesses - four in the case of Zina, two for all other Hadd 
offences. These evidentiary requirements are further clarified. In cases 
of Zina, for example, actual vaginal penetration needs to be witnessed in 
order for the testimony to be deemed admissible for consideration. In all 
Hadd cases, the witnesses must be sane, adult, male Muslims of piety. 
They must never have been convicted of Qazf or other slander, and the 
court must be satisfied that they are truthful, abstain from major sins and 
maintain the inclination not to indulge in minor ones.43 Courts are 
required to carry out an investigation on prosecution witnesses called 
"purgation." Unfortunately, neither the courts nor the law have estab-
lished a uniform method for purgation; in practice, each judge follows 
his own methods, ranging from cross-examination of witnesses to in-
quiries among their community regarding their characters. Yet some 
judges have failed to carry out purgation due to lack of knowledge of the 
law or simple carelessness.44 This can often work against the accused, a 
problem that is compounded when competent counsel is unavailable to 
request purgation, or due process.45 
Prior to any discussion of the severe punishments of Hadd, it is 
imperative to note some of the values underlying the Islamic law, which 
acts as its foundation. First, such punitive measures are only to be 
administered if the offences are proved conclusively and beyond any 
chance that an innocent person will suffer undeserved punishment. 
Second, where the rights of an individual are concerned, every attempt 
must be made to ensure that they are not violated.46 Third, in cases where 
liability for the crime cannot be attributed to any one individual, the 
people of the locality at large must compensate the victim. Finally, 
42 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 9. 
43 Pakistan, supra note 6 al 7. 
44 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 62. 
45 Jail Criminal Appeal 267/1of1985 Khuda Baksh. 
46 Pakistan, supra note 6 at I 0. 
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Islamic jurisprudence does not traditionally encourage or approve of 
long-term imprisonment.47 These four principles, in theory, underpin 
any application of punishment. 
4. Ta'azir 
The word Ta 'azir translates as "punish."48 In cases where the strict 
requirements of proof for Hadd offences are not met, Ta 'azir punish-
ments or discretionary punishments for non-Hadd offences may be 
applied. In fact, the vast majority of violations under the category of 
Hudood are punished as Ta 'azir offences, rather than Hadd. 49 This 
enables the continuity of the Hadd's deterrent factor, while at the same 
time maintaining just proportionality amongst proven offences.50 
Ta 'azir punishments include: slapping, lashing or flogging (at most 
thirty-nine times in total); exile; imprisonment for the purposes of 
producing repentance; public proclamation of the convict on a donkey's 
back; admonition or reprimand (involving slapping and beating); aban-
donment; compensation payable to the victim in cases of displaced 
property; monetary compensation for injury; and suspension or dis-
missal from one's workplace. It is impo11ant to note that Hadd punish-
ments are seen as the exception rather than the rule, since it is so difficult 
to establish the required burden of proof. Ta 'azir punishments are thus 
far more frequently invoked, and thus an in-depth discussion of them is 
warranted in any analysis of Hudood laws. 
In Pakistan, with the promulgation of the Hudood Ordinances and 
Rules, a number of legal changes have taken place through the introduc-
tion of Ta 'azir punishments. For example, prior to the Hudood laws, 
children under the age of seven bore no criminal liability, and children 
under the age of twelve were punishable only if they understood the 
nature and consequences of their acts. While the Hudood Ordinances 
exempt children from Hadd punishments, this is not so with Ta 'azir 
punishments. For example, the Ta 'azir punishment for Zina committed 
47 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 11 . 
48 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 24. 
49 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 31. 
so Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 9. 
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by children, though lighter than that for adults, is nonetheless a five-year 
sentence and thirty discretionary stripes. For all other Ta'azir offences, 
children are tried and punished as adults. In one notorious case, a child 
was awarded two years rigorous imprisonment a more severe sentence 
that usually denotes a term of hard labour for the convicted criminal -
for stealing the equivalent of eight Canadian dollars. 51 On the other 
hand, Ta 'azir punishments for theft and armed robbery are the same 
today as they were under the old penal code of 1860. The maximum 
duration of imprisonment permissible for theft, for instance, remains 
three years. 52 The rules of evidence for Ta 'azir offences are the same as 
those for all other so-called regular crimes. 
As mentioned earlier, Hadd punishments are only awarded to adults. 
Adulthood is defined in terms of age and sexual maturity - offences of 
theft and drinking, for example, require the accused either to have 
experienced puberty or reached the age of eighteen. For Zina and Qazf, 
the same standard applies for boys; for girls, either puberty or the age of 
sixteen must have been reached. This definitional standard, equating 
mental development with sexual maturity,53 has been criticized both on 
practical and realistic grounds. While puberty is defined by menstrua-
tion for women, and "signs of puberty" and the capability of reproduc-
ing for men, there is little definite con-elation between this standard and 
concepts of mental development and capacity. Additionally, holding 
women accountable from the beginning of their transitory period and 
men towards the end is further evidence of the discriminatory nature and 
effect of the laws in Pakistan. 
II. PAKISTAN'S HUDOOD LAWS 
Prior to the enactment of the Hudood laws, Pakistan's criminal legal 
system was based in toto on the principles of British common law. The 
country's penal code, criminal procedure code, evidence act, and even 
the comt structure were all acquired from its fonner British rulers. This 
51 1980 P.Cr.L.J. 1955 Jamil Ahmed. 
52 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 74. 
53 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 53. 
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Anglo-Saxon system was applied to Pakistan in its entirety, with the 
exception of the tribal areas, where customary law prevails to this day. 
The changes that were made in 1979 to the legal status quo took the 
procedures and punishments for some offences out of the conventional 
structure and placed them under the new branch of Islamic law.54 
There are five ordinances and orders that make up Pakistan's 
Hudood laws: The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) 
Ordinance, 1979; The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordi-
nance, 1979; The Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 
1979; The Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, 1979; 
and The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. Rape, adul-
tery, theft, armed robbery, and drinking alcohol were all offences in 
Pakistan prior to the enactment of the Hudood laws. The new laws 
introduced only two new crimes, that of Qazf and that of fornication. It 
is important to note here that the Hudood laws apply equally to all 
Pakistanis, Muslim and non-Muslim.55 
The rules of evidence for each Hadd offence are laid down in the 
provisions of the Hudood Ordinances themselves. The evidentiary rules 
for Ta 'azir punishments, in contrast, are found in the Qanoon-e-
Shahadat, or the law of evidence, which is applied to all of Pakistan's 
laws. Pakistan's evidence act of 1872, based on British common law, 
was repealed in 1984 and replaced by the Qanoon-e-Shahadat in an 
effort to bring the law of evidence in conformity with Islamic injunc-
tions. Remarkably, the Qanoon-e-Shahadat, with the exception of nine 
sections, is exactly the same as 1872' s evidence act. The differences 
include a greater focus on the evidentiary principles of Islamic law, 
including explicit rules regarding the required number of eyewitnesses, 
their character and their competence. 
Regarding the number of witnesses, one section of the Qanoon-e-
Shahadat states that the exact number shall be determined in accordance 
with the injunctions of Islam. It specifies that "evidence in matters 
pertaining to financial or future obligations, if reduced to writing shall 
be attested by two men, or one man and two women, so that one may 
remind the other, if necessary, and evidence shall be led accordingly."56 
54 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 23. 
55 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 24. 
56 .Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 30. 
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Regarding competence, the Qanoon-e-Shahadat states: 
[The] Court shall determine the competence of a witness in accordance 
with the qualifications prescribed by the injunctions of Islam as laid 
down in the Holy Qu'ran and Sunnah for a witness, and where such 
witness is not forthcoming, the Court may take the evidence of a 
witness who may be available.57 
Both these differences between the Qanoon-e-Shahadat and the evi-
dence act of 1872 have made little de facto difference to legal practices, 
due in part to their vagueness,58 though it is worthy of note that the 
acceptability of evidence varies from one crime to another under Islamic 
law. However, they have had one significant impact with regard to 
confession and its impact on the prosecution's task. Since it is now 
mandatory to enforce Hadd punishments if the required burden of proof 
is met, an attained confession today effectively eliminates plea-bargain-
ing as an available option for the prosecution during a complex investi-
gation, as they have no discretion to offer a lighter sentence or immu-
nity. 59 
A number of observations have begged the question: what have the 
Hudood Ordinances really changed in Pakistan? Critics note that 
Ta 'azir punishments are more frequently applied in contrast to Hadd 
punishments, evidentiary requirements with regards to Ta' azir offences 
are very similar to that of the pre-Hudood law in Pakistan, and 'regular' 
subordinate criminal courts are used for 'Islamic law' cases. The general 
answer to the above query is a limited change, but with nonetheless 
rather severe ramifications. Part of the answer lies in Ta'azir punish-
ment for Zina, which in both theory and practice has had an adverse 
impact on women. This creates a fallout effect on Qaef laws, which too 
have had discriminatory effects against women. The rest of the answer, 
albeit a smaller part, lies in the introduction of public whippings to 
Pakistan's penal system.60 Each of these variables are discussed below, 
under the headings of the c01Tesponding legislation. 
Procedurally at the level of first instance, offences of Hadd are tried 
by the regular criminal courts. However, presiding justices must now be 
57 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 30. 
58 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 31. 
59 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 49. 
60 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 32. 
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Muslim, unless the case involves a non-Muslim accused. Moreover, 
Hadd punishments can only be executed after the Federal Shari'ah 
Court, an appellate court, has heard the case. Non-Muslim lawyers may 
not appear before this religious court, regardless of their client's reli-
gion. The eight justices on the Bench are ideally to be Islamic scholars 
with formal legal training, though judges with both these qualifications 
remain rare. The tenure of justices is three years, extendable by the 
appointing authority, the President of Pakistan. Additionally, these 
judges can be transferred within the country at any time. 61 
Critics of the Islamic branch of Pakistan's legal system have pointed 
to the lack of both security of tenure and fonnal legal training as reasons 
for waning confidence and respect towards the Shari'ah Courts. One 
clear example of this distrust can be found in the 1981 Hazoor Baksh 
case, where the punishment of stoning to death was challenged as being 
un-Islamic.62 Of the five judges presiding, three allowed the appeal, one 
dissented in part, declaring stoning to death as a Ta 'azir offence rather 
than one of Hadd, and one dissented in full. The majority cited passages 
from the Qur 'an, Islam's holy text, and from Hadith, or "tradition," 
which includes reported sayings or actions of the Prophet Mohammad 
(peace be upon him) and is one of the sources of Islamic law.63 These 
judges rejected other Hadith as inauthentic, and used judicial tools such 
as logic of omission and analogy to support their position. Upon issu-
ance of the verdict, religious hardliners protested in the streets and 
called for a review of the judgment. Under pressure, the President of 
Pakistan passed a constitutional amendment granting the Federal 
Shari'ah Court the power to review its own judgements.64 Less than a 
month after the challenged verdict, the Federal Shari'ah Court bench 
was reconstituted, retaining only one justice. Five judges, one of whom 
had already given his opinion as amicus curae during the original 
hearing, were appointed to the religious court. The amicus curae, not 
surprisingly, had supported stoning to death as a valid Islamic punish-
ment. Shortly thereafter, the State of Pakistan filed a review petition, 
61 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 24. 
62 PLD 1981 FSC 145 Hazoor Baksh. 
63 Coulson, supra note 29. 
64 Constitutional (Amendment) Order 1981 (P.O. No.5 of 1981) Section 3 (w.e.f. April 13, 
1981 ). 
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pursuant to which the newly reconstituted court ruled that the Federal 
Shari' ah Court lacked jurisdiction to examine the Islamic character of 
the Hudood Ordinances. They also allowed the appeal, in favour of 
stoning to death as a valid punishment. Only one judge ruled partly in 
dissent, holding that stoning to death is a Ta 'azir punishment. One of the 
justices, writing in majority, concluded his judgement by stating that 
"[T]his is a pure matter of belief and faith as followers of the Holy 
Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Caliphs which requires no reason-
ing or arguments." It appeared that this judge had based his decision on 
religious belief, without reasoning. This brings into question whether 
judges should be allowed to do this, or if instead they should be 
expected to apply and interpret the law after hearing both sides of an 
issue with an open mind. 
After examination of the Hazoor Baksh case, it should be of no 
surprise that there is a lack of knowledge of the basic workings of the 
Islamic legal branch of the system on the part of the judiciary itself. In 
fact, a large number of trial court decisions reveal a total lack of 
comprehension regarding the Hudood criminal legal scheme. Trained 
judges of the trial court have been known to make gross errors at law 
when dealing with both Islamic and non-Islamic legal principles, and 
are continually being reprimanded for doing so by superior courts 
(though this is not to say that those higher courts themselves have not 
been guilty of gross errors).65 One frightening example of such incompe-
tence comes from a case in Azad Jammu and Kashmir where both a Qazi 
(a member of the Ulema acting as a judge) and a sessions judge were 
presiding over cases involving charges of Zina. In that case, the judge-
ments of the Qazi were not decided on fact. The High Court later 
observed that, since the Qazis generally cannot read medical reports or 
reports of "chemical examiners" or pathologists, they often base their 
decisions on guess work. The High Court commented that unless medi-
cal reports were all translated to Urdu or, alternatively, the Qazis were 
assigned only to tasks not requiring knowledge of English, the people 
would continue to be deprived of justice.66 Yet another problem with the 
Federal Shari'ah Court has been that of using non-existent facts and un-
65 NLR 1984 SD 46 Naseer Hussain; PLD 1981 FSC 115 Muhammad Rafiq; PLD 1981 FSC 
224 Ghulam Ali. 
66 NLR 1987 SD 20 I Abdul Qadus. 
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pleaded arguments in justifying their often inconsistent positions. This 
took place in the Masood Aziz case,67 where the bench was convinced 
without apparent reason that the commission of incest is not possible. 
There was no mention in the decision as to why a punishment for incest 
nevertheless exists in Pakistani law. 
The religious courts have also been inconsistent in their findings, 
reasoning and precedent. For example, attempt to rape is punishable 
with half the sentence prescribed for rape and preparation of rape is 
punishable with a maximum of two years under Hadd law.68 Unf011u-
nately, the courts have not been consistent in interpreting these two legal 
concepts. 69 In one case, the co-accused were convicted on charges of 
attempted Zina, and the Federal Shari'ah Court interpreted attempt to 
commit Zina as an act that would have been performed if not interrupted 
by outside intervention. By contrast, under similar circumstances in a 
matter of rape, the courts found a highly similar fact situation which 
amounted to preparation.70 
An incompetent bench only compounds the effects of an already 
inept bar. One blatant example of the compounded problem can be 
found in the Saleem case. In that case, the incompetence of the lawyers 
was met by the insensitivity and arrogance of the judges. The defence 
attorney, who had been paid in advance, failed to show up at trial court, 
and thus no cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses took 
place. Not only was Mr. Saleem sentenced to a Hadd punishment, there 
was no mention, even on appeal, of the incident. 71 
Despite such inadequacies, the Federal Shari'ah Court now also has 
jurisdiction to declare any law in Pakistan repugnant to Islam, with the 
exception of constitutional provisions, Muslim personal law, fiscal law, 
and procedures of the court. Upon declaration of repugnancy, the in-
valid provisions cease to have force and effect and the government has a 
set period of time to amend the offensive legislation. 72 Appeals from the 
Federal Shari'ah Court are heard by the Supreme Court - Shariah 
67 Criminal Appeal No. 288/L of 1988, Masood Aziz. 
68 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 99, 115. 
69 PLD 1982 FSC 179 Shaukat; PLD 1983 FSC 53 Yaseen; NLR 1987 SD 143 Ibrahim. 
70 PLD 1983 FSC 105 Pak Muhammad & another. 
71 Jail Criminal Appeal No.42/1 of 1985 Saleem. 
72 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 25. 
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Bench, a bench consisting of five justices. Again, finding Ulema, or 
Islamic scholars, to occupy seats on this bench has been a great chal-
lenge. 
Sadly, all of these problems are adversely compounded by the fact 
that the police force in Pakistan is corrupt, inefficient, excessively large, 
and lacking the supervisory safeguards necessary for the proper care and 
safety of female inmates. 73 This has caused many problems for the 
accused who, from arrest to verdict, witness a considerably protracted 
process afflicted by the legal and systemic incompetence mentioned 
above. 
Regarding the Hudood laws themselves, much criticism has been 
levelled regarding gender discrimination. 74 While the purpose of this 
paper is not to criticize Islamic injunctions themselves, one question 
which may be asked is, does the Pakistani justice system benefit by 
having evidentiary laws that discriminate on the basis of sex? It has been 
argued above that Pakistan is neither a truly Islamic state, whatever the 
definition, nor one applying a perfect set of Islamic laws. Given these 
facts, alongside the caveat from Islam itself that Hadd offences are to be 
treated most cautiously and are only to be punished accordingly, and 
given the meeting of the strictest burdens of proof, one questions 
whether Pakistan does in fact house a society that warrants a simplistic 
or codified usage of religious law. Pakistan today is a society in which 
men and women freely intermingle, both in the business world and in 
their personal lives. This itself is contrary to the basic concepts of 
mehrum or purdah, or the societal separation of males and females in the 
utopic Islamic social structure. To apply Islamic gender-dependent laws 
in such an 'un-Islamic' state is difficult to justify. For example, in a 
society where women for the most part remained outside of the business 
world, the requirement that only men can bear witnesses would pose a 
far less severe a practical problem. However, in a society such as 
Pakistan, which sees large-scale participation of women in the work-
place, it seems unjust that a woman who witnesses a crime is disallowed 
to testify, especially when the absence of that testimony could wrong-
fully acquit an accused. 
73 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 120. 
74 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 22. 
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To espouse such laws, as valid as they may be in a hypothetical 
context, as catalysts of Islamization, such as Pakistan is doing, is noth-
ing more than wishful thinking. Change in society, especially with 
regards to the proper practice of a religion, requires education and 
understanding of underlying principles and the consequences of their 
adherence, not the implementation of misunderstood and ill-suited laws 
which do nothing more than deter justice and promote disrespect for 
sacred concepts. As it is Pakistan's national sport, an analogy to cricket 
would be apropos: Pakistan needs to field a trained team first, and only 
afterwards begin issuing penalties and warnings. To penalize players 
first in the hope that it will improve their performance and correct their 
mistakes is inherently backwards, inefficient, and ultimately unfair to 
the players, to the game, and to the rules themselves. 
Gender based discrimination can also be cited on a more general 
level. Men and women are routinely treated inequitably with regards to 
character issues. In one case, a woman was criticized for being of "bad 
character;" there was no mention of the man's abandonment of his wife 
for over ten years. 75 Other odious examples exist, such as the granting of 
favour to men in cases of rape or Zina where the woman has been found 
to be of "easy virtue" or "loose character."76 Favour has also been 
granted to the accused when the victim, usually female, is seen as 
"habitual."77 Men too are discriminated against by the system, albeit in 
fundamentally different ways. The major problem that has plagued men 
is one of favouritism by the courts on the basis of appearance; courts 
have been more likely to show leniency to individuals who present a 
more religious appearance. 78 
The issue of admissibility of evidence and its related problems has 
been mentioned above. These problems exist with regards to non-
Muslim evidence as well and have been used to criticize Islamic law in 
Pakistan. Pakistan continues to struggle with both its definition of Islam 
and the criteria by which different sects are judged to be Muslim or not. 
It was thus that the Pakistani government excommunicated the 
Quadiani sect and their members outright; other groups such as the Aga 
Khanis, could suffer the same fate at any time. Until such distinctions 
75 Cr. Appeal No. 137 /1, or 1986 Mst. Gui Nisa and Fazal Dad. 
76 PLD 192 FSC 240 Falek Sher; 1982 P.Cr.L.J. (Lah) Muhammad Abbas. 
77 1983 P.Cr.L..I. 2014 (Lah) Shabbir Ahmed Watto. 
78 1982 P.Cr.L..I. 1202 Zahoor Ahmed. 
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can be made objectively and apolitically, however, it seems both unfair 
and arbitrary to attempt to impose them in the witness stand. 
It is generally agreed that Pakistan's Hudood laws are imperfect 
even when viewed from a purely religious standpoint, and many people 
in Pakistan are asking that they be totally repealed, or at least suspended. 
It seems clear that Pakistan must wait to impose true Islamic law until it 
has the resources and the wherewithal to develop the fully trained team 
of our analogy that such an implementation would require. 79 
1. Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 
The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 
deals with theft and highway robbery. If theft is proven to the standard 
required by Hadd law, the right hand of a first time offender is to be 
amputated. For a second offence the left foot is to be amputated. 
Imprisonment for life is the ordained penalty for committing theft a third 
time. 
There are exceptions to these rules, however. 80 If one of the hands of 
the offender has already been lost or the left hand or the left thumb or at 
least two fingers of the left hand are missing or totally unusable by 
whatever cause, in the case of a first offence his remaining hand is not to 
be amputated. Similarly, a second offence would not result in an ampu-
tation where there is only one usable foot or there are only three or fewer 
remaining toes on that foot. For a third offence, if it is proven to the 
satisfaction of the Federal Shari'ah Court that the convict has become 
sincerely penitent, they may set the offender free on terms and condi-
tions at their discretion. There are additional exceptions, depending on 
the relationship between the complainant and the offender, for various 
minor categories of theft. The general Ta 'azir punishment for theft is 
rigorous imprisonment for up to three years. 
For highway robbery, the elements of which include the threat of 
force and the intention of robbing someone, punishment varies propor-
tionally to the nature of the offence, based on factors such as whether 
79 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 18. 
80 Pakistan, supra note 6 at I I . 
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property has been displaced and whether injury or murder has been 
committed. Punishment varies, from rigorous imprisonment for three 
years in addition to thirty stripes, to the amputation of the right hand and 
left foot, to capital punishment (but only if the value of the property 
stolen exceeds nisab. )81 Death is only to be imposed in cases of theft 
which result in murder.82 If the victim is injured during the robbery, 
additional punishment is prescribed as per the Penal Code. Parallel 
exceptions exist in situations of highway robbery.83 However, where a 
left hand or right foot are missing or totally unserviceable, a maximum 
of fourteen years of rigorous imprisonment and thirty stripes are pre-
scribed as an alternative to amputation for highway theft.84 
There are other limitations and also preconditions for awarding 
Hadd punishments for theft and (highway) robbery. In order to qualify 
for a Hadd punishment, the value of the stolen property must be in 
excess of the value of 4.457 grams of gold (approximately U.S.$100). 
This value is called nisab. The value of the stolen prope1ty is to be 
divided by the number of thieves, and if the amount is greater than or 
equal to nisab per person, the Hadd punishment is to be awarded. 
However, Hadd is not to be imposed if the offender and the victim are 
closely related to each other, applying towards one's spouse, ascendants 
or descendants, siblings, parents, or aunts or uncles. Such is also the 
case if guests steal from the houses of their hosts, or where servants steal 
from their employers. Further, the theft of wild grass, fish, birds, dogs, 
pigs, intoxicants, musical instruments, or perishable foodstuffs is ex-
empt from Hadd punishment. Additionally, if a creditor steals from his 
debtor's property, the value of the debt owed is deducted from the total 
amount, and if the net amount falls below nisab, Hadd is not to be 
awarded. Finally, if any theft is committed under duress or of apprehen-
sion of death owing to extreme hunger or thirst, Hadd is not to be 
invoked. 85 
One severe criticism of Pakistani Hudood laws with regard to theft, 
is the exclusion of embezzlement of public funds of any amount from its 
definitional ambit. This is cited as a blatant example of the system's 
81 Nisab is defined below. 
82 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 12. 
83 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 13. 
84 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 52. 
85 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 51. 
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complete disregard for the notion of proportionality, both between 
crimes and their corresponding punishments, and between penalties for 
various crimes themselves. 86 This is further evidence of the discrimina-
tory nature of Pakistan's laws and its legal system. Surely the common 
man, a man or woman of the masses, cannot be expected to have access 
to public funds; rather, only members of the ruling elite can. These 
individuals, some themselves lawmakers, appear to have exempted 
themselves in any meaningful sense from the reach of the Hudood laws, 
at least in the context of theft, since the very public funds that they 
would be most likely to steal are paradoxically incapable of being stolen 
under the law. This has given credibility to the argument that a system 
has been constructed in Pakistan in which the elite are in fact above the 
law. Law, in order to render justice, needs to be applied across the land, 
regardless of wealth, class, or any other socio-economic characteristics, 
without exception. 
Hadd laws in Pakistan also contribute in other ways to the overall 
disproportional nature of the law in Pakistan. For example, if someone is 
seen by two adult male Muslims to be stealing objects worth a total of 
U.S.$100 from an enclosed place, he or she can be punished with the 
removal of one of their hands (in the case of a first or second offence). 
On the other hand, someone in the sight of several women and/or non-
Muslims can steal much more money and be punished under the cat-
egory of Ta 'azir, not Hadd, with far less severe penalties. The same 
individuals could also steal a car and escape Hadd punishment, as long 
as the car is not in an enclosed room from where it was wrongfully 
taken. Again, while these apparent inconsistencies may be easily recon-
ciled in our hypothetical utopia, Pakistan is far from being such a place, 
and is hardly the ideal jurisdiction for the implementation of such laws. 
Another indicator that the masses are the socio-economic group 
most adversely affected by Hudood laws is the fact that a large number 
of appeals from Hadd sentences are made by the convicted, not directly 
to counsel, but through jail authorities for pro bona assistance.87 Such 
legal aid in Pakistan, when available at all, is largely provided by under-
trained and incompetent representation. This problem is compounded 
86 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 21. 
87 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 48. 
86 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
by the fact that the vast majority of Hadd punishments are imposed upon 
the poor and relatively voiceless sections of Pakistani society.88 
2. Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 
The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance deals with the 
crimes of rape, abduction, adultery, and fornication. The word Zina 
literally translates as "consensual sexual relations outside of a lawful 
marriage, including adultery and fornication." Penetration is sufficient 
to constitute either offence.89 Islam holds both the man and woman 
equally guilty for committing fornication, with the exception of rape, in 
which case the man is held solely responsible. The commission of Zina 
by a married person is considered more serious than when it is commit-
ted by a non-married individual; correspondingly, the punishment is 
much more severe. Punishment for Zina can be as harsh as being stoned 
to death, for married adult Muslims, or as lenient as l 00 stripes, for non-
Muslim adults and single adult Muslims. For a muhsan, an adult Muslim 
who is sane and either a widow, widower, divorced, or married, who has 
had sexual intercourse with another sane Muslim who is married, the 
punishment is stoning to death. Stoning to death must result in death, 
though that need not be by the stoning itself; the law in Pakistan states 
that "such of the witnesses who deposed against the convict as may be 
available shall start stoning him and, while stoning is being carried on, 
he may be shot dead, where upon stoning and shooting shall be 
stopped. "90 
Stoning to death awarded upon confession will of course involve no 
witnesses. The law is silent as to who shall then cast the first stone. 
Despite these specific penalties, the courts are given much discretion in 
sentencing an individual under the Zina laws. Punishment for cases that 
do not meet the Hadd standards of proof ranges from rigorous imprison-
ment of ten years up to twenty-five years plus thirty stripes. 
This ordinance also encompasses the various other offences, which 
include: kidnapping; abducting or inducing a woman to compel her to 
88 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 67 
89 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 23. 
90 Section 17 Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. 
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marriage against her will; subjecting a kidnapped person to illicit sexual 
intercourse or to unnatural lust; the buying or selling of persons for the 
purposes of prostitution; and co-habitation caused by a man deceitfully 
inducing, taking away, or detaining a woman in belief of lawful mar-
riage, with criminal intent. 91 
The Hudood laws in Pakistan have of course changed certain con-
cepts legally with regard to rape and Zina from the pre-Hudood law 
period. Women, unlike prior to the Hudood laws, can now be charged 
with the offence of rape. Wives can no longer be considered raped. 
Children can now, regardless of age, be convicted of Zina or rape. 
Consent of a child can today be put forward as a defence by the accused. 
Punishment for rape under the pre-Hudood criminal legal system was 
banishment for life or imprisonment extending up to ten years plus a 
monetary penalty92 and the rape of a wife over the age of twelve was 
punishable with imprisonment of up to two years. Under the Hudood 
laws, the Ta 'azir sentence for adults accused of rape is a maximum of 
twenty-five years and a minimum of four years. Minors can receive up 
to a five-year sentence plus a maximum of thirty stripes or lashes. 93 
Additionally, under the old penal code of Pakistan, adultery was a 
crime, whereas sex between unmarried consenting adults was not. The 
punishment for adultery was imprisonment for five years and/or a fine. 
Further, only the husband of the alleged adulteress could make com-
plaints of adultery. If the complainant dropped charges, criminal pro-
ceedings against his wife would automatically be dropped. The adulter-
ess could subsequently not be punished for adultery. Currently, any 
individual can bring charges which cannot be dropped, under any cir-
cumstances. 94 
Rape as mentioned above is an exceptional crime within the Zina 
category and is worthy of further elaboration. Rape is universally one of 
the most difficult crimes to prove, since witnesses are generally unavail-
able. Therefore, as long as the burden of proof with regard to the guilt of 
the accused lies with the prosecution, courts cannot convict persons 
accused of rape solely on the testimony of the victim. This principle is 
91 Pakistan, supra note 6 at 13. 
92 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 85. 
93 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 86. 
9" Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 86. 
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not based on the ground that the evidence of the victim is unreliable, but 
is a rule of prudence recognizing that at times women may give false 
evidence, just as males may. The consequence of this rule is that rape 
can be proved on the evidence of the victim, but provided it is corrobo-
rated. This includes medical evidence corroboration. However in 
Pakistan's social climate, with the great stigma that is attached to rape, 
very few women have themselves medically examined promptly follow-
ing a violation,95 and for the same reason delay filing criminal com-
plaints. 96 Because of this, most prosecutions of rape are dismissed. This 
obviously does not imply false testimony by the victim, bmTing a 
contradictory finding by the comi. Unfortunately for Pakistani women, 
when a prosecution for rape fails, police go on to prosecute the victim 
for adultery under the Hudood laws, knowing well that the penalty for 
such a crime can be as severe as stoning to death. This approach of the 
police seems to be based on two assumptions: firstly, the allegation of 
the rape is false because the accused was acquitted (it is explained above 
why this is in fact not the case); secondly, the allegation of rape is an 
admission of sexual intercourse, therefore the dismissal of the 
prosecution's case amounts to an implied confession of adultery. This 
conclusion flies against all common sense, since a confession is an 
admission of guilt, while an allegation of rape is a repudiation of guilt. 
The Supreme Court of Pakistan in the Rehmani decision has stated 
clearly that only a statement that is a clear admission of guilt, or fact 
constituting guilt, is a confession.97 lt was added in that decision that a 
statement cannot be treated as a confession by relying on only inculpa-
tory evidence, excluding anything exculpatory. 
Additionally, it appears that a victim of rape now runs the risk of 
being punished under Zina whether she files a complaint or not. If a 
woman does, she must prove absence of consent. If she does not, the 
alleged offence can be changed from that of rape to Zina and the victim 
herself then becomes a co-accused. Having not filed a complaint, if she 
subsequently becomes pregnant, she can be charged with Zina as well. 
There have been numerous cases where the alleged rapist has been 
acquitted for lack of conclusive evidence, whereas the victim went on to 
95 PLO 1983 FSC 110 Shabbir Ahmed. 
96 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 13. 
97 PLO 1978 SC 200. 
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be punished for not having conclusive evidence to show that the unex-
plained pregnancy was because of rape. One such case was that of Safia 
Bibi.98 Although the decision of the lower court was later overturned on 
appeal, the underlying problem - that of the burden of proof shifting to 
the victim of rape to explain her pregnancy - was not addressed. Thus, it 
appears that while the accused rapist is deemed innocent until proven 
guilty, his female victim is presumed to be guilty until she proves herself 
innocent. Males, too, are unfairly treated in this respect by the system at 
times. A major problem has been that of courts converting charges of 
rape to those of Zina when there is insufficient evidence to prove the 
former. 99 Principles of criminal law would call for the accused to be 
acquitted. 
Yet it is not only the state prosecution that is to blame for misapply-
ing the law as set out by the Supreme Court. Despite provisions in the 
law as mentioned above with the requirement of either an un-retracted 
confession or of consistent evidence from four honest and reliable male 
witnesses, trial court judges in Pakistan have convicted women of 
adultery solely on the basis of pregnancy. Pregnancy was treated by 
these judges as either circumstantial evidence or as some so11 of implied 
confession. However, circumstantial evidence is barred under the 
Hudood laws and the view that an allegation of rape not proved amounts 
to a confession is contrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court. 100 
These judges, despite sitting on a religious bench, are under a duty to 
uphold the law of the land. 
The aforementioned problem of illiteracy has had resounding nega-
tive effects in the area of Zina specifically, and generally on all Hudood 
crimes with regards to confession evidence. Ignorance of the law, 
compounded by the lack of public access to legal information and 
advice, has led to the accused themselves inadvertently sabotaging their 
own cases. One case in which this occurred is Mushtaq Ahmed in which 
the co-accused, under a misconception of the law and its underlying 
concepts, incorrectly confessed to having committed Zina. Evidence to 
98 NLR 1985 SD 145 Safia Bibi. 
"" NLR 1986 SD 5 Sultan Maqsood Vs. the State; 1980 P.Cr.L.J. 1037 lhsan Ahmed alias 
Nana; PLO 1982 FSC 220 Niamat Ali; PLO 1983 FSC 541 Sohail Iqbal; PLO 1986 SC 12 
Khushi Muhammad alias Bogi; NLR 1987 SD 185 Bahadur Shah; PLO 1983 FSC 117 
Ubaidullah. 
100 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 14. 
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the contrary later established his mistake and cleared the accused of 
Hudood charges. 101 
In addition to the above problems inherent in the system, there are 
two specific kinds of cases that are indicative of the society in which 
these laws are being applied: false prosecutions filed by possessive 
fathers and by ex-husbands. Social values in Pakistan are rapidly chang-
ing. For example, divorced women are now remarrying and young 
women are marrying against the wishes of their fathers. Even when such 
marriages are in accordance with Muslim law however, fathers have 
filed cases of adultery against their own daughters and ex-husbands 
have maliciously filed cases against their ex-wives under the Hudood 
laws, on allegations that the women are guilty of fornication. While the 
accused need only show a marriage ce1iificate or orally testify to mar-
riage to obtain an acquittal, the agony inflicted on such women in 
contesting these generally false charges is unwarranted, especially 
given the stigma of such allegations in the society at large. More 
problematic, however, is the fact that there are a large number of 
wrongful convictions due simply to the fact that appeals are a luxury not 
available to most of the poor. 
Another example of inherent flaws in Pakistan's legal system can be 
cited from the Mohammad Sarwar and Shahida Parveen case. In that 
case Shahida was married to a Khushi Muhammad, but claimed that she 
had divorced him prior to marrying the man who was her co-accused in 
Zina. Mr. Muhammad denied the divorce. A divorce deed was placed on 
record by the defence, allegedly bearing Mr. Muhammad's signature. 
Under Pakistan's family laws, all Muslim divorces have to be regis-
tered. Doing so after oral pronunciation upon the wife by the ex-
husband as failure to do so is an offence. There is no time limit on the 
registration however, and the offence is thus pragmatically ineffective. 
This allows men to effectively disallow their ex-wives from re-marry-
ing, without her knowing. This in turn means that the ex-husband can 
threaten allegations of Zina at any time, which is inherently unfair to the 
woman and can easily be used against her in the most severe way, 
considering the potential consequences of penalty. In Shahida's case, 
the law worked against her as the divorce deed was not registered. 102 
101 Criminal Appeal No. 15/1 of I 984 Mushtaq Ahmed and another. 
102 NLR 1988 (SD) FSC 188 Mohammad Sarwar & Shahida Parveen. 
THE HUDOOD LAWS ... 91 
Other tragic situations have stemmed from marriages ultimately 
held to be void. Evidence of couples having lived together, despite being 
under the impression of valid matrimony, has been taken to constitute 
confession to Zina. 103 Uniquely and fortunately, this confession may be 
officially retracted, sending the case for re-trial to the regular, more 
secular courts. 104 
3. Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance 
The Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance relates mostly to 
false allegations of Zina and is punishable with eighty stripes. However, 
for successful prosecution, it must be proven that the allegations are 
made intentionally and clearly imputing Zina. Insinuation is not enough, 
and in fact, it appears that the allegations must be made maliciously. 105 
While the evidentiary requirements for Qazf are the same as those 
for theft and the other non-Zina Hadd offences, an exception is made for 
charges of adultery made by a husband against his wife. In such cases, 
the husband must first swear by Allah four times that his allegation is 
true and then a fifth time, saying that the curse of Allah may be upon him 
if he is lying. The wife can then rebut his allegation by similarly 
swearing a total of five times that the allegation is false and that if she is 
lying that the curse of Allah may be upon her. Not only is the allegation 
of the husband then rebutted, the marriage is automatically dissolved. 
This process is known as Lian. 
Another exception to the general law is that Qa:zf made against a 
descendant does not attract Hadd punishment, but that of Ta 'azir; the 
Ta 'azir punishment for Qazf being a maximum of two years imprison-
ment plus forty stripes. Additionally, the victim of Qazf must be a 
muhsan, hence Qazf committed against persons who are not capable of 
sexual intercourse will not attract Hadd. Consequently as well, Hadd 
will also not be awarded if false allegations are made against non-
Muslims, unmarried minors or old people who are no longer capable of 
intercourse. 
103 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 55. 
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Procedurally, charges of Qazf, unlike in cases of Zina, can be 
dropped by the complainant with finality. 106 Also, the police cannot 
make an anest of Qazf without a wanant. 107 This however has not ren-
dered Pakistan's law of Qa-".f immune from criticism and misapplication. 
Examples of such have been cited above under the heading of Zina laws. 
4. Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 
Prohibition was first imposed in Pakistan in the year 1977 by the 
government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with the promulga-
tion of the Prohibition Act of 1977. The Prohibition (Enforcement of 
Hadd) Order, enacted two years later made certain alterations to its 
predecessor, including the cunent prohibition against drinking alcohol, 
which applies to all Muslims in Pakistan. The Order initially exempted 
the use of drugs from punishment, a seeming inconsistency better under-
stood from a sociological perspective than a theological one. Narcotics 
were rarely used in Pakistan prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the ensuing refugee crisis during the 1970s. Drugs were therefore 
not a major concern to Pakistani lawmakers of the time, though use has 
steadily been growing and drugs are now a widely sought substitute to 
legally unavailable alcohol. The use, traffic, and sale of narcotics have 
thus subsequently been added to the Hudood laws. 
As with each of the Hudood laws, exceptions have been legislated 
for the use of alcohol in Pakistan. Non-Muslim Pakistanis may be issued 
permits to use liquor, but only for religious ceremonies. 108 Additionally, 
an exception exists for non-Muslim foreigners who may be issued 
permits for drinking liquor of a "reasonable amount." It appears that this 
'reasonable amount' is discretionary. What is unclear is whose discre-
tion it is up to, other than a judge at trial. The condition, for both these 
exceptions, is that drinking is not to take place at any public place 
including hotels, motels, and clubs, excluding private rooms occupied 
by the permit holder. In addition, the licence holder may not enter a 
public place in a drunken state. 
10" Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 52. 
107 .Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 83. 
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The Hadd punishment of drinking for Muslims is eighty stripes, and 
for cases that do not fall in the category of drinking liable to Hadd 
(including illegal drinking by non-Muslims) rigorous imprisonment for 
up to three years or a maximum of thirty stripes, or both. Additionally, 
punishments are provided for the illegal import, export, transpo1i, 
manufacture, possession, packing, sale, or service of any intoxicant, 
including alcohol. 
Evidentiary laws for drinking liable to Hadd require proof of two 
witnesses, Muslim males of piety. But there is one qualifier: they need 
not be eyewitnesses. These witnesses may be from the medical profes-
sion or be laypersons that have only smelled liquor from the mouth or 
vomit of the offender. One exception to this exception is that the 
prosecution needs to establish that the drink was not taken or owing to 
extreme hunger or thirst. 109 
Procedurally, Pakistan's prohibition laws state that arrest can only 
be made after a medical test has been carried out on the accused. Police 
cannot arrest those drinking privately without a warrant. If a police 
officer arrests someone solely on the suspicion of drinking, they can 
themselves be imprisoned for up to six months, in addition to being 
financially penalized. Not surprisingly, most people who have been 
charged under this Order have been from the lower economic strata of 
society. 110 This is yet another indicator of the inherent and systemic bias 
of Pakistan's legal system against its poor masses. Alcohol, being illegal 
and mostly imported, is obviously sold in Pakistan at a premium; likely 
a premium the poor cannot afford. Thus, while the ruling and moneyed 
elite are the most likely in Pakistan's society to indulge in the purchase 
and use of alcohol, they are effectively exempt from punishment. Fur-
ther, the fact that this is the only Hudood law in Pakistan to carry a 
possible penalty for mistakes made by police officers is yet more 
evidence of the lawmakers protecting themselves from what they would 
most likely find themselves guilty of. The police, after all, are unlikely 
to risk imprisonment over a single arrest. 
Finally, while trial courts have been generally incompetent in 
awarding Hadd punishment as a result of the many exclusionary provi-
sions in the law, 111 appellant courts have been quick in converting them 
109 PLD 1983 FSC 55 Ghulam Nabi A wan. 
110 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 75. 
111 Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 67. 
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to those of a Ta'azir level, 112 except in cases of drinking offences. 113 
This, too, may be seen as another example of the bench protecting the 
interests of the elite in Pakistani society. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Surah 5, Al Ma'idah, Ayat 40 translates to: "Knowest thou not that to 
Allah (alone) belongeth the dominion of the heavens and the earth? He 
punisheth whom He pleaseth, and He forgiveth whom He pleaseth: and 
Allah hath power over all things." 114 In a further clarification, the first 
line, "Knowest thou not" is footnoted: 
Punishment really does not belong to mortals, but to Allah alone. 
Only, in order to keep civil society together, and protect innocent 
people from crime, certain principles are laid down on which people 
can build up their criminal law. But we must always remember that 
Allah not only punishes but forgives, and.forgiveness is the attribute 
which is most prominently placed before us. It is not our wisdom that 
can readily define the bounds of forgiveness or punishment, but His 
will or Plan, which is the true standard of righteousness and justice. 115 
It is precisely this principle that those manning the Pakistani legal 
system are missing. If the citizens, police, and justices were to truly 
follow Islam by showing and practicing mercy, the effects of the 
Hudood laws would be far closer to what they are meant to be: just. 
However, if such were the case, it would mean that Pakistan understands 
its predominant religion and is following it as an Islamic state. As seen 
above, such is not the case. In this widely illiterate nation, the religion, 
as practiced, is based on what could be described as an "Islam for 
Dummies" approach, while Islam in its full complexity goes essentially 
112 Criminal Appeal No. K-12 of 1980 Ashfaque Ahmed; PLD 1981 FSC 108 Latif and 
Ghulamullah; PLD 1981 FSC 132 Lal Bux; Criminal Appeal No.24/k of 1980 Hassan; 1 982 
P.Cr.L.J. 476 (Kar) Majoo Shah; 1981 P.Cr.L.J. 248 (Kar) Yakub. 
113 Criminal Appeal No.222/1 of 1985 Muhammad Anwar; Criminal Appeal No.225/L of 1985 
Asghar Ali. 
114 The Holy Qur'an- English translation of the meanings and Commentary, King Fahd Holy 
Qur'an Printing Complex, Al-Madinah Al- Munawarah, 1410 H. 
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unstudied. Added to this are widespread cultural ailments including 
mass discrimination against women, systemic coITuption, endemic illit-
eracy, incompetent members of the bar and judiciary, and all the other 
chronic ills of a developing nation, prominent among them a poor 
institutional infrastructure. These problems all lead to only one conclu-
sion; that the Hudood laws in Pakistan must be suspended immediately 
and indefinitely, until such time that the nation is deemed socioeco-
nomically, culturally, and religiously prepared to implement Islamic 
law, as per its divine precepts. Failure to do so will allow the current 
injustice and mockery of Islamic law to continue, the effects of which 
will throw the masses into further feelings of helplessness, despair, and 
inequality with regards to the ruling elite. This has the potential to create 
acute instability at the grassroots level, which in turn could lead to 
rebellions by various groups against the union of Pakistan, or even a 
full-scale revolution directed against the current law makers and ruling 
class. It has been noted repeatedly in this essay that the lawmakers have 
tilted the legal system in their favour. To keep these laws in place may 
ultimately prove to do just the opposite. 
In the meantime, Pakistan needs to develop a knowledgeable group 
of scholars of the Shari 'ah and offiqah law and needs to recognize that 
all sources of Islamic law must be used in the development of an Islamic 
legal 'code,' including proper analogy and consensus of a credible and 
revered Ulema. Additionally, it needs to incorporate the general prin-
ciples of the religion in its laws and implementing system, including the 
re-opening of the door of ijtihad and emphasizing the principle of 
mercy, as referred to above, from the Qur'an. Procedurally, Pakistan 
needs to reassess its legal infrastructure, including the duality of its 
courts and plurality of its legal doctrine. Only after these issues are 
examined and implemented with credibility can a more fundamental and 
permanent change be considered. 
